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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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_____________ 
 
No. 12-1118 
_____________ 
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GLENN FLEMMING, 
a/k/a Nasir Huggins 
 
GLENN FLEMMING, 
        
Appellant 
_____________ 
 
Appeal From Denial of Motion for Reduction of Sentence 
Entered in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2:03-00148-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 5, 2012 
_____________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 We are again asked to determine whether a certain 
category of defendants is eligible for a sentence reduction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), given the lowered crack-cocaine 
guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission under the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 
2372 (2010).  Specifically, we consider individuals who were 
designated as career offenders under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and 
3 
who were granted a downward departure from that 
designation pursuant to § 4A1.3.  We conclude that the 
Guidelines‟ definition of “applicable guideline range,” see 
U.S.S.G., app. C., amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011), makes clear 
that such defendants are not eligible for resentencing.  We 
therefore affirm the District Court‟s denial of Appellant‟s 
motion. 
 
I. 
 
A. Flemming’s Original Sentencing 
 
 Appellant Glenn Flemming‟s case is by now familiar 
to this Court.  See United States v. Flemming, 256 F. App‟x 
453, 454-55 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential); United States 
v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Flemming II”).  In brief, Flemming was convicted in 2004 
of one count of possessing with intent to distribute crack 
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 841(b)(1)(C), and 
two firearm counts.  Based on the offense levels for crack-
cocaine set forth in § 2D1.1 of the 2001 edition of the 
Sentencing Guidelines—applicable to Flemming at the time 
of his original sentencing—Flemming‟s Guidelines range was 
calculated as 92 to 115 months‟ imprisonment.  See 
Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 255.  However, because Flemming 
had two prior controlled substances convictions, he was 
classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
1
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  Section 4B1.1(a) subjects a defendant to the career 
offender designation if: “(1) [he] was at least eighteen years 
old at the time [he] committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony 
that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
4 
This enhancement increased his offense level from 24 to 34 
and his criminal history category from V to VI, for a 
Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months.     
 
Flemming moved for a downward departure pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, which in 2001 permitted a sentence 
departing from the “otherwise applicable guideline range” if 
the District Court found “reliable information . . . that the 
criminal history category does not adequately reflect the 
seriousness of the defendant‟s past criminal conduct or the 
likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.”  
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2001).  The District Court granted the 
motion and concluded that the proper Guidelines range was 
calculated by returning to the range based on the crack-
cocaine offense levels, 92 to 115 months.  Flemming II, 617 
F.3d at 255-56.  The Court then sentenced Flemming to 175 
months in prison (115 months from the Guidelines range, 
consecutive to a 60 month term for one of the firearm 
convictions).  We affirmed on direct appeal.  Flemming, 256 
F. App‟x at 455-58. 
 
B. First Resentencing And Instant Motion 
 
 In 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued 
Amendment 706, lowering by two the base offense levels for 
most crack-cocaine offenses, and it later made that 
amendment retroactive.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 
(Nov. 1, 2007); U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 713 (May 1, 2008).  
Flemming then moved for a reduction of sentence under 18 
                                                                                                     
offense; and (3) [he] has at least two prior felony convictions 
of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense.” 
5 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) on the basis of these amendments.  As 
explained below, we ultimately ruled that Flemming was 
eligible for a reduction.  See Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 272.  
On remand, the District Court recalculated the Guidelines 
range as 77 to 96 months based on the new crack-cocaine 
tables and sentenced Flemming to 137 months in prison (77 
months from the Guidelines range and a consecutive 60 
month sentence for one of the firearm convictions). 
 
 In 2010, the Sentencing Commission issued 
Amendment 750 to the Guidelines, further lowering the base 
offense levels for most crack-cocaine offenses by two, and, 
subsequently, the Sentencing Commission also made that 
amendment retroactive.  See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 750 
(Nov. 1, 2011); U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 759 (Nov. 1, 2011).  
Flemming then filed a second motion for a reduction of 
sentence, which the District Court denied.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
 While district courts are generally prohibited from 
“modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed,” a defendant may be eligible for a reduction of 
sentence if the sentence was “based on a sentencing range 
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission” and if “a reduction is consistent with applicable 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 257.  If these 
two requirements are met, it is in the sentencing court‟s 
discretion whether to resentence.  Id.  The parties dispute 
6 
whether a reduction in cases like Flemming‟s is consistent 
with the Commission‟s applicable policy statements.2   
 
The Sentencing Commission has stated that a 
reduction in sentence pursuant to a retroactive amendment to 
the Guidelines is not consistent with its policy statements 
unless the amendment has “the effect of lowering the 
defendant‟s applicable guideline range.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).  Thus, the narrow question here is whether 
amendments to the crack-cocaine guidelines, such as 
Amendment 750, have the effect of lowering the “applicable 
guideline range” of a defendant subject to the career offender 
designation, but who received a downward departure under 
§ 4A1.3.  As they did in Flemming II, the parties seem to 
agree that, if “applicable guideline range” refers to the range 
calculated based on the enhancements provided by the career 
offender designation, then Flemming is not eligible for 
resentencing because Amendment 750 did not have the 
“effect of lowering” that range.  Conversely, if the phrase 
refers to the range calculated pursuant to the crack-cocaine 
offense level, after Flemming received a departure under 
§ 4A1.3, then Flemming is eligible for resentencing because 
Amendment 750 did have the effect of lowering that range. 
 
We confronted these arguments in Flemming II, and 
we reiterate them here because they constitute the basis of 
Flemming‟s instant motion.  In Flemming II, given that the 
Guidelines did not then define the term “applicable guideline 
range,” Flemming urged us to look to the Guidelines‟ 
                                              
2
  The parties agree that the first part of this test is met 
because Flemming‟s sentence was “based on” a sentencing 
range that has been lowered.  See Gov‟t Br. at 15.  
7 
Application Instructions, contained in § 1B1.1, for “guidance 
in determining the point at which a defendant‟s „applicable 
guideline range‟ is determined.”  Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 
261.  As they do today, the Application Instructions in effect 
at the time of Flemming II directed sentencing courts to 
“apply the various provisions and chapters of the Guidelines 
in a specific order.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Namely, at step 6 
of the calculation, a sentencing court was required to 
“[d]etermine the defendant‟s criminal history category as 
specified in Part A of Chapter Four” and “[d]etermine from 
Part B of Chapter Four any other applicable adjustments.”  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(f) (2001).
3
  We thus credited Flemming‟s 
argument that because the downward departure of § 4A1.3 is 
contained in Part A of Chapter Four, “one plausible reading 
of the Application Instructions [is that] sentencing courts are 
directed to apply § 4A1.3 departures at step [6].”  Flemming 
II, 617 F.3d at 264.  Flemming was eligible for resentencing 
under this line of reasoning because the “applicable guideline 
range” is calculated after step 6 and therefore corresponds to 
the crack-cocaine guideline calculated under § 2D1.1 and 
lowered by Amendment 706.
4
  We nevertheless further noted 
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  At the time of Flemming II, the Application 
Instructions‟ steps were designated as (a) through (h), but, on 
November 1, 2010, they were re-designated as (1) through (8) 
in order to “adopt[] the three-step approach followed by a 
majority of circuits in determining the sentence to be 
imposed.”  U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 741 (Nov. 1, 2010). 
  
4
  At the time Flemming II was decided, the “implication 
of our reasoning in Doe [was] that a defendant‟s „applicable 
guideline range,‟ for purposes of § 1B1.10, has been set once 
a court finishes applying step [8]” of § 1B1.1(a).  Flemming 
8 
that the provisions of § 4A1.3 are also considered a “policy 
statement” under the Guidelines and that the Application 
Instructions direct sentencing courts to consider policy 
statements only after the applicable guideline range 
calculation has taken place, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(b) (2010).  
We reasoned that, therefore, Flemming was not eligible for 
resentencing to the extent the instructions could be interpreted 
to direct calculation of an “applicable guideline range” at step 
8, based on the pre-§ 4A1.3 departure from the career 
offender levels.  After analyzing other relevant provisions of 
the Guidelines, we concluded that the Guidelines as a whole 
were “grievously ambiguous and uncertain as to whether 
Flemming‟s applicable guideline range is his pre- or post- 
§ 4A1.3 departure range,” and thus held that he was eligible 
for resentencing based on the rule of lenity.  Fleming II, 617 
F.3d at 270 (formatting and citation omitted). 
 
 In this second motion for resentencing, Flemming 
essentially reiterated the arguments he made in Flemming II.  
The District Court, however, denied the motion, concluding 
that the Commission‟s new definition of “applicable guideline 
range,” added to the Guidelines by Amendment 759, makes 
clear that it lacks authority to resentence defendants such as 
Flemming under § 3582(c)(2).  We now exercise plenary 
review over that conclusion.  See United States v. Savani, No. 
11-4359, __ F.3d __, __, 2013 WL 2462941, *4 (3d Cir. June 
10, 2013).
5
 
                                                                                                     
II, 617 F.3d at 262 (citing United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305 
(3d Cir. 2009)). 
  
5
  The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
9 
III. 
 
Although Flemming‟s argument would otherwise be 
controlled by our holding in Flemming II, the new definition 
of “applicable guideline range” supersedes our reading of the 
Guidelines there and requires us to revisit that decision.  See 
Savani, 2013 WL 2462941, at *1, *5 (holding that the new 
definition of “applicable guideline range” supersedes our 
holding in Doe, 564 F.3d at 305).  We now reconsider 
Flemming II in light of Amendment 759.
6
 
 
 “Applicable guideline range” is now defined as “the 
guideline range that corresponds to the offense level and 
criminal history category determined pursuant to § 1B1.1(a), 
which is determined before consideration of any departure 
                                              
6
  Since Amendment 759 was enacted, we have 
considered the resentencing eligibility of defendants like 
Flemming, but we have not had occasion to revisit Flemming 
II in light of Amendment 759.  In United States v. Ware, for 
example, we assumed without deciding that Amendment 
759‟s definition of “applicable guideline range” rendered 
offenders such as Flemming ineligible for resentencing and 
addressed only whether the Amendment is binding.  694 F.3d 
527, 531-32 (3d Cir. 2012).  And in United States v. Barney, 
we determined the effect of another amendment to the 
Guidelines, Amendment 651, on the eligibility of prisoners in 
Flemming‟s position, a question we left open in Flemming II.  
672 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2012).  Barney does not dispose of 
Flemming‟s case because in Flemming II we held that we 
may not consider Amendment 651 for purposes of 
determining Flemming‟s eligibility for resentencing.  See 
Flemming II, 617 F.3d at 267, 271 n.26. 
10 
provision in the Guidelines Manual or any variance.”  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1(A) (2011); see also U.S.S.G. 
app. C., amend 759 (Nov. 1, 2011).  We recently interpreted 
this language in the context of prisoners subject to statutory 
minimums but sentenced below that range pursuant to a 
substantial assistance motion filed by the Government under 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.  See Savani, 2013 WL 2462941, at *2.  In 
Savani, we concluded that we were unable to determine 
whether the words “the guideline range that corresponds to 
the offense level and criminal history category determined 
pursuant to § 1B1.1(a)” refer to the calculation mandated at 
step (7) of the Application Instructions, § 1B1.1(a)(7), or to 
the calculation performed after including “all eight steps 
delineated under § 1B1.1(a), including § 1B1.1(a)(8).”  Id. at 
*6.  This case involves a slightly different question.  Whereas 
in Savani we had to determine whether the “applicable 
guideline range” is calculated at step (7) or step (8) of 
§ 1B1.1(a), the question here is whether the § 4A1.3 
departure is calculated at step (6) before the “applicable 
guideline range” is determined at steps (7) or (8), or whether 
it is calculated at § 1B1.1(b), entirely after the “applicable 
guideline range” has been determined.   
 
The definition of “applicable guideline range” does not 
on its face address whether a § 4A1.3 departure calculation is 
properly understood as occurring at either step (6) or 
§ 1B1.1(b).  However, the definition does state that the 
applicable guideline range is “determined before 
consideration of any departure provision in the Guidelines 
Manual or any variance.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n. 1(A) 
(2011) (emphasis added).  This language makes clear that 
regardless of when a § 4A1.3 departure is calculated, that 
departure is ignored for purposes of determining the 
11 
“applicable guideline range.”  Accordingly, the “applicable 
guideline range” for a defendant like Flemming is the range 
calculated pursuant to the career offender designation of 
§ 4B1.1, and not the range calculated after applying any 
departure or variance.  Flemming‟s arguments that § 4A1.3 
departures are somehow different simply ignore the 
unequivocal rejection of the consideration of “any departure 
provision” when determining the “applicable guideline 
range.” 
 
In other words, under Flemming‟s view of the order in 
which sentencing occurs for career offenders, a sentencing 
court does three things at step (6) of § 1B1.1(a).  First, the 
court calculates the criminal history category under § 4A1.1; 
second, it enhances the criminal history category and offense 
level based on the career offender designation of § 4B1.1; 
and, third, the court departs downward from that category 
based on § 4A1.3.  The court subsequently calculates a 
Guidelines range under step (7).  To be sure, this 
understanding of the manner in which sentencing occurs in 
practice continues to be “plausible.”  Flemming II, 617 F.3d 
at 264.  The problem for Flemming is that, although a 
sentencing court may calculate the guidelines range the 
defendant is sentenced under after considering departures and 
variances, the Guidelines now make clear that this final 
determination of the defendant‟s range is not the “applicable 
guideline range” that courts may consider in evaluating a 
sentence reduction motion.
7
   
                                              
7
  The difference between the defendants in Savani and 
defendants like Flemming is inherent in the structure of the 
Guidelines.  For the former, the court determines a Guidelines 
range at step (7) or (8) before it applies any departure, 
12 
Our reading is further confirmed by the Commission‟s 
stated reason for adding the new definition of applicable 
guideline range: to “adopt[] the approach of [other] Circuits” 
holding that career offenders granted § 4A1.3 departures are 
not eligible for resentencing.  U.S.S.G. app. C., amend. 759.  
Flemming offers no persuasive argument to the contrary, 
particularly given that most of his contentions are based on 
pre-Amendment 759 cases or readings of the Guidelines.  See, 
e.g., Flemming Br. at 14 (citing United States v. Munn, 595 
F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010)).  Indeed, our holding is consistent 
with that of the Second Circuit, which considered the exact 
question presented here in light of Amendment 759.  See 
United States v. Steele, 714 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam) (relying on definition of “applicable guideline range” 
to hold that defendants such as Flemming are not eligible for 
resentencing). 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s order denying Flemming‟s motion for resentencing. 
                                                                                                     
including § 5K1.1 departures.  For the latter, by contrast, the 
court is not mandated to calculate a Guidelines range until 
after it has reached the career offender enhancement.  See 
Savani, 2013 WL 2462941, at *13 (Fuentes, J., concurring). 
